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The Impact of Shrouded Fees: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Abstract
We study a natural experiment in the Indian mutual funds sector that created a 22 month period in which
closed-end funds were allowed to charge an arguably shrouded amortized fee whereas open-end funds were
forced to charge standard entry loads. We find that allowing closed-end funds to charge the shrouded type of
fee led to a proliferation of closed-end funds in the market; 45 new closed-end funds were started over this 22
month period collecting 9.1 billion $U.S, whereas only two closed-ended funds were started in the 66 months
prior to this period collecting .42 billion $U.S., and no closed-ended funds were started in the 20 months after
this period. We argue that other theoretical determinants of the closed versus open ended organizational form
did not change discretely around the natural experiment and thus are unlikely to explain the sudden
emergence and disappearance of closed-end funds. We find closed-end funds did not perform better in terms
of raw or risk-adjusted returns. If all the investors in closed-end funds during this period had invested in the
lower fee open fund variety instead they would have paid 4.25 percent less in fees over this 22 month period,
equal to approximately 500 million dollars in extra fees.
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We study a natural experiment in the Indian mutual funds sector that created a 22 month
period in which closed-end funds were allowed to charge an arguably shrouded amortized fee
whereas open-end funds were forced to charge standard entry loads. We find that allowing
closed-end funds to charge the shrouded type of fee led to a proliferation of closed-end funds in
the market; 45 new closed-end funds were started over this 22 month period collecting 9.1 billion
$U.S, whereas only two closed-ended funds were started in the 66 months prior to this period
collecting .42 billion $U.S., and no closed-ended funds were started in the 20 months after this
period. We argue that other theoretical determinants of the closed versus open ended organi-
zational form did not change discretely around the natural experiment and thus are unlikely
to explain the sudden emergence and disappearance of closed-end funds. We find closed-end
funds did not perform better in terms of raw or risk-adjusted returns. If all the investors in
closed-end funds during this period had invested in the lower fee open fund variety instead they
would have paid 4.25 percent less in fees over this 22 month period, equal to approximately 500
million dollars in extra fees.
∗*Contact information: anagol@wharton.upenn.edu and hoikwang@wharton.upenn.edu. Thanks to James Choi,
Shawn Cole, Todd Gormley, Olivia Mitchell, David Musto and Shing-Yi Wang for helpful comments. Yuqing Fan,
Anant Shukla, and Amit Agarwal provided excellent research assistance. All errors are our own.
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1 Introduction
An important puzzle in investor behavior is the prevalence of high-fee investment vehicles that pro-
vide no benefits in terms of return performance. This puzzle applies to the popularity of actively
managed mutual funds as described in Gruber (1996) and the popularity of high-fee index mutual
funds (Choi et al., 2009). Two possible explanations exist. One is that high-fee funds offer some
other unobservable benefits that investors find worth paying for. Possible benefits include compen-
sation for brokers who lower investor search costs as in Hortacsu and Syverson (2004), or ”financial
advice, customer service, and discounted access to complementary investment instruments” (Choi
et al., 2009). Another explanation is that investors ignore fees, and thus competition amongst
mutual fund providers does not reduce prices to competitive levels (Gabaix and Laibson (2006),
Carlin (2009)). Identifying which explanation is correct has important implications for financial
regulatory policy. Under the explanation that high fee funds offer other benefits, regulation will
not improve welfare. Under the explanation that investors ignore fees, however, policies to improve
disclosure and educate investors could have important effects on investor welfare.
To what extent can public policy hasten the rate of investor learning regarding shrouded fees?
Two recent studies have experimentally varied the presentation of investment fees while holding all
other fund characteristics constant to test whether making fees less shrouded changes fund choice,
and both find little evidence to suggest that changing the framing of fees has large impacts on
investor decisions. Beshears et al. (2009) conducts an experiment with Harvard staff to determine
whether investors respond differentially to statutory fund prospectuses versus the SEC’s ”Summary
Prospectus.” The SEC intended the Summary Prospectus to make salient the characteristics of
each fund, including fees, as a result of its much shorter length than the statutory prospectus.
Interestingly, Beshears et al. (2009) find that whether subjects are presented with the Statutory
Prospectus or the Summary Prospectus has no economically or statistically significant effect on
fund choices. They also find that receiving the Summary Prospectus does not change how subjects
respond to sales loads. Choi et al. (2009) conduct a laboratory experiment to understand why
investors do not minimize fees when choosing S&P 500 index funds. They also find that providing
additional information on funds, such as a cheat sheet that summarizes fees or an explanation
about what a index fund is, did not have a large effect on investors’ choices.
This paper is the first to use actual observational data on mutual fund flows, in conjunction
with a natural experiment on a fee disclosure policy, to test whether shrouding and un-shrouding
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fee structures can have an impact on investor mutual fund choices. We study two law changes
imposed by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), India’s financial market regulator
(analogous to the SEC in the United States). The first law change occurred on April 4, 2006. SEBI
mandated that closed-ended funds could only charge ”initial issue expenses” and that open-ended
funds could only charge entry loads.1 The only difference between initial issue expenses and entry
loads was that initial issue expenses could be amortized. To illustrate what amortization means in
this context, suppose an investor subscribed to 100 rupees in a closed-end fund with a six percent
amortized initial issue expense. Over the tenure of the closed-end fund (typically three years in
the Indian context after which the fund would automatically convert to an open-ended fund), six
rupees would be extracted from the net asset value of the fund. In practice, .0055 rupees would be
extracted per day which is equal to six rupees divided by 1095 days (the number of days in three
years). Throughout the paper I refer to the period before this law change, i.e. the period before
April 4, 2006 as Regime 1.
Because initial issue expenses were to be taken out of the net asset value gradually, investors
were unlikely to be able to distinguish changes in the net asset value of the fund versus removal of
the initial issue expenses. By contrast, investors are more likely to be aware of entry loads because
these are deducted in a lump sum fashion from the initial investment.2 Furthermore, mutual fund
advertisements for closed-end funds typically advertised a zero entry load and only described the
initial issue expenses in the later pages of the offer document.
The second law change occurred on January 31, 2008; throughout the paper we refer to the
period between the first and second law changes as Regime 2. SEBI announced that any closed-end
fund started after that date would no longer be allowed to charge the amortized initial issuance
expenses; instead they would have to charge entry loads. I refer to the period after the second
law change, i.e. the period after January 31, 2008 as Regime 3.3 We hypothesize that disallowing
1Throughout this paper we use the term “closed-end funds” for a type of limited liquidity fund that became
popular in the Indian market in the last 5 years. These closed-end funds are quite different from the closed-end
funds typically studied in the finance literature as all of them did allow investors to retrieve their money at net-asset
value at specific times throughout the year. Of the 21 closed-end funds I have liquidity period data on 5 offered
daily redemption, 2 offered weekly redemption, 9 offered monthly redemption, 2 offered quarterly redemption, and 3
offered half-yearly redemption. The Indian closed-end funds were also not listed on secondary exchanges. This is in
contrast to standard closed-end funds where funds can only be extracted by selling shares on the secondary market.
Similar to standard closed-end funds, however, these funds did not allow any new money to enter the fund after the
initial corpus was raised.
2My argument regarding the difference in salience between initial issue expenses and entry loads is similar to
Barber et al. (2005) who contend operating expenses are less salient than entry loads.
3To summarize, Regime 1 is the period before April 4, 2006 before the first law change. Regime 2 is the period
from April 4, 2006 through January 31, 2008 between the two law changes as Regime 2. Regime 3 refers to the period
after the second law change up until the present.
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closed-end funds to charge the less salient initial issue expenses would reduce the incentive for
mutual fund companies to create new closed-end funds. Because the law change did not forbid new
closed-end funds from charging high entry loads, this hypothesis is not driven by a price-cap being
imposed on closed-end funds, but only a change in the type of fee that could be charged.
Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that allowing closed-end funds to charge amortizable
initial issue expenses led to a proliferation of closed-end funds in the market; 45 new closed-end funds
were started during Regime 2, whereas only two closed-ended funds were started during Regime
1, and no closed-ended funds were started during Regime 3. The proportion of fund flow amounts
to new closed versus open funds during Regime 2 was 43 percentage points higher compared to
Regimes 1 and 3. Further, we find that, on average, closed-end funds charged 6 percent in initial
issue expenses, whereas open-ended funds charged only 1.75 percent in entry loads. The fact that
no closed-ended funds were started after closed-end funds were forced to charge entry loads rather
than amortizable initial issue expenses suggests that investors were not cognizant of the high initial
issue expenses they were paying; otherwise fund companies could have charged six percent entry
loads and gotten some investors to pay for them during Regime 3.4 It appears that mutual fund
companies realized that investors would not be willing to pay 6 percent entry loads for closed-end
funds and thus stopped creating closed-end funds. We estimate investors paid an additional 4.25
percent in fees over this 22 month period. Closed end funds perform slightly worse in terms of raw
or risk-adjusted returns, thus we find no evidence that investors received better performance for
the higher fees that closed-end funds charged. If investors had directed their money towards open-
ended funds instead of closed-ended funds during this period they would have saved approximately
500 million U.S. dollars in fees5.
We also examine alternative explanations for the rise and fall of closed-end funds over this
period. I find no evidence that these law changes imposed a price ceiling on closed or open-ended
funds. It is important to note that both initial issue expenses and entry loads had a price-cap
of six percent during Regime 2. I discuss the alternative explanation that initial issue expenses
were not shrouded, but that Indian investors have discount rates that make them prefer paying
4A number of newspaper articles and policy reports written at this time noted the increase in popularity of closed-
end funds after the imposition of Regime 2, and argued that fund companies did this with the intention of hiding
fees. For examples, see the following articles: (1) ”Should You Buy Closed-End Mutual Funds?” published in Rediff
on December 1, 2006 (2) ”The Closed-Ended Comeback” published in Money Today on November 16, 2006. (3)
The Consultation Paper on Minimum Common Standards for Financial Advisers and Financial Education by India’s
Committee on Investor Awareness and Protection (The Committee on Investor Awareness and Protection, 2009).
5For comparison purposes, Choi et al. (2009) calculate that U.S. investors who invested in the lowest fee S&P 500
index fund versus other higher cost S&P 500 index funds would have saved $206 million dollars in expenses.
4
fees over time instead of as a one-time entry load. In order for this to explain the proliferation of
closed-end funds during the period between these law changes investors would have to have discount
rates of approximately 790 percent per year. Finally, I show that other theoretical determinants
of the open versus closed form, as described in Stein (2005), did not change discretely around the
natural experiment and thus are unlikely to explain the sudden emergence and disappearance of
closed-ended funds.
An important advantage of the natural experiment we study here is that we are able to
observe how firms respond to a regulation that attempts to make their fees more transparent.
This paper is unique in that it evaluates an “unshrouding” policy and finds that the policy had a
large effect in reducing the demand for the formerly shrouded product.6 Based on this evidence
alone it is not possible to determine whether this policy was welfare improving, because some of the
consumers who paid high shrouded fees for closed-end funds may have switched to non-mutual fund
products with similarly high shrouded fees such as endowment life insurance policies. Nonetheless,
this evidence does suggest that a broad based program of regulating shrouded fees could have large
effects on consumer behavior as theorized by Gabaix and Laibson (2006).
This paper complements the experimental work described previously because it allows us to
observe how firms and consumers will respond to a real change in regulation. Prior experimental
work is partial equilibrium in the sense that it shows only how consumers respond to new disclosure
norms; outside the laboratory, however, firms may change their products to find other ways of
shrouding fees. In addition, the natural experiment studied here has the advantage of involving
substantial amounts of money and actual investor decisions. I find that the particular transparency
initiative of forcing all funds to charge entry loads rather than amortized fees had large effects on
the investment decisions of Indian individual investors. While prior experimental studies found that
providing more transparent information did not cause investors to invest in lower fee alternatives,
here I conclude that the second regulation imposed by the Indian regulator essentially eliminated
higher-fee closed-end equity funds from the market. This paper also builds on Barber et al. (2005),
which argues that entry-loads are less shrouded than operating expenses by presenting evidence that
U.S. investors learned to avoid entry-loads more quickly than operating expenses. The authors are
not able to take advantage of any exogenous changes in entry-load or operating expenses, however,
and thus one weakness of their results is that they cannot rule out alternative explanations regarding
6Ausubel (1991) and Woodward (2003) study disclosure regulations for credit cards in the United States and find
small effects.
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other services associated with these specific types of fees.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents background information on the Indian
mutual fund industry. Section 3 describes the language and implementation of the law changes
studied here. Section 4 describes the data sources used in the paper. Section 5 presents the
empirical results. Section 6 discusses other important alternative explanations such as whether the
law changes imposed any explicit price ceilings and other theoretical determinants of the closed
versus open fund organizational form as suggested in Stein (2005). Section 7 concludes.
2 The Indian Mutual Fund Industry
The first government-run mutual funds were established in India in 1963, but the sector was not
opened to private firms until 1993. Indian mutual fund assets under management in 2009 were
equal to approximately U.S. $ 90 billion.7 Though only 1/100th the size of the U.S. mutual fund
industry (which as of 2008 had U.S. $ 9.6 trillion in assets),8 Indian assets under management
have a real growth rate more than double that of the growth rate of assets under management in
the United States (12 % average annual real growth in assets under management in the Indian
mutual fund industry since 1997, versus 5.3% real average annual growth in the U.S.).9 Mutual
funds comprised 3.7 percent of household assets in 2005-2006 and 7.8 percent in 2007-2008 (The
Committee on Investor Awareness and Protection, 2009). There are approximately 10 million
mutual fund investors in India, about one-fifth the number of investors in the United States (Halan,
2010).
As in the United States, a large portion of mutual fund sales comes through a network of
thousands of mutual fund brokers throughout the country known as Individual Financial Advisors
(IFAs) and distributors (Kamiyama, 2007).10 IFAs and distributors typically sell funds to investors
that live close to them. A retail investor in India would typically invest in a mutual fund by
approaching a distributor and choosing a fund in which to invest. If the investor chose to purchase
10 shares of XYZ fund, the distributor would collect one payment from the investor that included
the cost of the shares, the entry load, and any issue expenses due upon initial purchase. The
7The India Rupee / U.S. dollar exchange rate taken from finance.yahoo.com on Monday, October 26, 2009.
8These data come from the 2009 Investment Company Fact Book which is produced by the Investment Company
Institute (the trade association of mutual funds and other asset management companies in the United States). I
include mutual funds and closed-end funds for comparability with the Indian data.
9Growth rates of assets under management calculated from monthly reports of the Association Mutual Funds in
India monthly reports.
10Bergstresser et al. (2009) estimate that U.S. investors paid 15.2 billion dollars in distribution fees in 2002, which
are not much less than the 23.8 billion dollars spent on management fees in that same year.
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distributor would transfer this full amount to the mutual fund company that issued the shares,
and the mutual fund company would then pay a commission to the IFA/distributor for selling the
shares. As of June 2006, 27 percent of sales of mutual funds came through IFAs, 30 percent came
through Distributors, 12 percent came through direct sales, and 31 percent came through banks
(Kamiyama, 2007). The Committee on Investor Awareness and Protection (2009) reported that
72.2 percent of inflows into mutual funds came through agents. The number of IFAs and distributors
is large; there are an estimated 40,000 IFAs in the country and 3000 distributors. Because IFAs
and distributors are said to be compensated through entry loads and initial issue expenses, many
industry followers believe that IFAs and distributors push investors into high fee funds to increase
their incomes.
When new funds, either closed or open, are started in India there is a one to two month offer
period where the fund collects an initial corpus of money for investment. For a closed-end fund,
after this “offer” period is completed, no new money is accepted into the fund. In an open-end
fund, there is a one-month window after the new period when no new money is accepted. After
this one-month period is over, the open-end fund begins to accept new money for investment at
the end of the day net-asset value (as in the United States). During the new offer period, the fund
company spends substantial amounts on advertising the fund, and IFAs and distributors try to
interest investors in the fund.
One important difference between the “closed” funds discussed in this paper and the closed-
end funds described in the large literature on closed-end funds in developed countries is that closed-
end funds in India over this period did not trade on a secondary market. The Indian closed-end
funds allowed initial investors the ability to withdraw their money at net asset value, usually at a
monthly frequency, but no new money could enter the fund after the initial offer period. Because of
this limited liquidity feature provided to initial investors mutual fund companies typically did not
list their closed end funds on the stock-exchange. Furthermore, all of the closed-end funds studied
here state in their initial prospectus that after three years they would automatically be converted
into open-ended funds.
3 Mutual Fund Fee Regulation
In this section, I describe the key mutual fund fee regulation changes that comprise the natural
experiment. I refer to the period before April 4, 2006 as Regime 1, the period from April 4, 2006
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through January 31, 2008 as Regime 2, and the period after January 31, 2008 as Regime 3.
3.1 Regime 1: Six Percent Price Ceiling on Initial Expenses of Creating a
Mutual Fund Scheme
The baseline regulations of the mutual fund sector in India were set out in the document Securities
and Exchange Board of India (2009). “SEBI (Mutual Funds Regulations), 1996.” This document
indicated that mutual funds could charge special fees during the new offer period provided that
initial expenses of floating the scheme shall not exceed six percent of the initial resources raised
under that scheme and such expenses shall be accounted in the books of account of the scheme as
specified in the Tenth Schedule.”
An important feature of Regime 1 was that funds could amortize the fees collected as initial
issue expenses. Suppose a fund raised 1000 rupees during the new fund offer period and charged
six percent as initial issue expenses. The fund company would then have the right to take 60
rupees out of the fund as initial issue expenses over the first three years of the fund. Note that
this was true for both open and closed-ended funds, i.e. the initial issue expense percentage rate
only applied to the amount of money raised during this initial offer period. It did not apply to
money that later entered an open-ended fund after the initial offering period. Typically funds
would take these initial issue expenses out of the fund spread over the first three years of the fund
as a way to artificially inflate the net asset value that was reported to investors. During Regime
1, there was also an important re-distributional feature of the amortization policy. Suppose after
1 year an investor took 500 rupees out of the fund. In Regime 1, this investor would only pay 20
rupees in initial issue expenses. If a second investor purchased shares from that initial investor and
waited two more years until the fund was automatically converted to an open-end fund he would
have to pay the remaining 40 rupees in initial issue expenses. Thus the amortization policy in
Regime 1 allowed mutual funds to charge initial issue fees in a way that made long-term investors
cross-subsidize short-term investors. Nevertheless, for this paper, the key thing to note is that, in
Regime 1, both closed-end and open-end funds were allowed to amortize in this manner. I show
later that given this level playing field between how fees could be charged and transparency, the
open-end organization form dominated the closed-end form.
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3.2 Regime 2: Framing Closed-End Versus Open-End Fund Fees Separately
To increase transparency on the total fees investors were being charged during the new offer period
to enter closed versus open-ended funds, SEBI issued a circular on April 4, 2006 forcing closed-end
funds to charge only initial issue expenses and not entry loads, and open-ended funds to charge
only entry loads and zero initial issue expenses. The relevant part of the circular read as follows:
I. Rationalisation of Initial Issue Expenses
a. The initial issue expenses will be permitted for closed-ended schemes only.
b. Open ended scheme should meet the sales, marketing and other such expenses
connected with sales and distribution of schemes from the entry load and not through
initial issue expenses.
c. Since closed-ended schemes are allowed to charge initial issue expenses, they shall
not charge entry load.
d. In close-ended schemes where initial issue expenses are amortised, for an investor ex-
iting the scheme before amortisation is completed, AMC [Asset Management Company]
shall redeem the units only after recovering the balance proportionate unamortised issue
expenses.
e. Conversion of a closed-ended scheme or interval scheme to open-ended scheme/ or
issuance of new units should be done only after the balance unamortised amount has
been fully recovered from the scheme.
It is important to note that Part (d) eliminated the ability of closed-end funds to amortize
initial issue expenses in such a way as to harm longer term investors. As described above, during
Regime 1, both open and closed end funds could allow investors who exited their funds early to
avoid paying their full proportion of the initial issue expenses. During Regime 2, a typical closed-
end fund would charge 6 percent as initial issue expenses and amortize them daily over the term
of the closed end-fund (usually 3 years). Suppose again that a closed-end fund raised 1000 rupees
by selling 100 shares and therefore had the right to collect .6 rupees in initial issue expenses per
share. By amortizing the expenses, the closed-end fund would collect .2 rupees per each year in
expenses, for a total of .6 rupees per share for the life of the closed-end fund. If an investor withdrew
500 rupees from the fund in the first year, this law change states that this investor would still be
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responsible for paying the full amount of initial issue expenses (30 rupees) that were owed on the
shares that they owned.
3.3 Regime 3: Forcing Closed End Funds to Call Their Expenses Entry Loads
On January 31, 2008, the Indian stock market regulator SEBI announced that all closed-end mutual
funds would no longer be allowed to charge up to 6 percent of money invested to cover issue expenses
(SEBI Circular No. 11/115723/08). Closed-end funds would now have to call their initial expenses
”entry loads” instead. The announcement stated:
Currently closed-ended schemes are permitted to charge initial issue expenses and not
charge entry load. In order to bring more transparency and clarity to the investors in
terms of the expenses charged to them in closed-ended schemes, SEBI Board in a recent
meeting decided as under:
(1) Henceforth, there will be no provision of charging initial issue expense and amorti-
zation of the same.
(2) All mutual fund schemes shall now meet sales, marketing and other expenses con-
nected with sales and distribution schemes from the entry load.
This circular would be applicable to all mutual fund schemes launched after the date of
the circular.
3.4 Summary of Three Fund Pricing Regimes and Predictions
Table 1 summarizes the three regimes of open versus closed-end fee regulation. The numbers in each
cell are the maximum fees that closed-end and open-end funds could charge to investors buying
funds during the new offer period. In moving from Regime 1 to Regime 2, the key change was
to force open-ended funds to collect initial fees only through entry loads, and to force closed-end
funds to collect entry fees only through amortizable initial issue expenses. In moving from Regime
2 to Regime 3, the only change was to force closed-end funds to charge entry loads instead of
amortizable initial issue expenses.
I wish to test whether the initial issue expenses were shrouded relative to entry fees. There
are two reasons why entry-loads may be more transparent to investors than amortizable initial
issue expenses. First, entry loads are deducted right at the time of the initial investment. When
the investor receives his first statement, he will immediately realize that money has been taken out
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for the entry load. Because initial issue expenses were typically amortized over three years, the
amounts removed for these costs are likely to have been hidden amongst market movements over
time (Barber et al., 2005). The second reason, which is likely a result of the first, is that Indian
mutual fund companies show the entry load on the front page of the mutual fund offer document
that distributors give to potential investors. If initial issue expenses are more shrouded than entry
loads we expect the following:
• Regime 1: Because both open-end and closed-end funds could shroud initial issue expenses
in this period, we expect determinants orthogonal to the types of fees charged to determine
whether open versus closed-end funds are started.
• Regime 2: In this regime, closed-ended funds could charge the shrouded fees, whereas open-
ended funds could not. Under the shrouding hypothesis, we expect the proportion of closed-
ended funds issued to increase substantially during this period.
• Regime 3: In this regime, neither closed or open ended funds could charge the shrouded fees,
so we expect the proportion of new funds started of this type to revert to levels seen during
Regime 1.
4 Data
The Association of Mutual Funds in India (AMFI) issues monthly reports on mutual fund flows
into nine major types of funds: (1) Income (2) Equity (3) Balanced (4) Liquid/Money Market (5)
Gilt (Government Bonds) (6) Equity Linked Savings Schemes (ELSS) - Equity (7) Gold ETFs (8)
Other ETFs (9) Fund of Funds Investing Overseas. Each monthly report includes the number of
new open and closed funds started and the total assets raised for each type of these funds. In this
paper I only focus on equity, ELSS, and Balanced funds because these are the only classes of funds
where retail investors make up a large proportion of asset holdings. ELSS funds are funds that have
a mandatory three year lock-in period. Dividends on ELSS funds are not taxed and when the ELSS
fund position is exited the investor pays long-term capital gains taxes. Balanced funds are funds
that invest in both equities and debt. Approximately 65 percent of the assets under management
in equity, ELSS, and Balanced funds come from retail investors, whereas only 4 percent of assets
under management in income funds come from retail investors. 11 This is primarily because many
11Statistics taken from Table 1 of the Assets Under Management and Folios - Category Wise - Aggregate - As On
March 31, 2009 document available at http://www.amfiindia.com/spages/AUMFolioData.pdf.
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of these income funds are owned by corporations that use them for cash management purposes.12
Table 2 presents summary statistics on the data used to formally test the shrouding hypoth-
esis. Here I present the average monthly flows into closed and open ended funds, by year, for three
types of funds: (1) Equity, (2) ELSS, (3) Balanced. The numbers are in hundreds of millions of
2009 U.S. dollars.13 The last column presents the average monthly return on the Bombay Sensex
stock index in each year, which I will use as a control variable. As no centralized database of
mutual fund fees exists in the Indian mutual fund sector, I collected this data by first creating a
list of all the mutual funds created since 1993 from the “Scheme Details” section of the Association
of Mutual Funds of India website. For each of the equity funds issued I searched online for their
offer documents and copied the available fee information from there; if the offer document was not
available, information from a variety of websites was used to track the characteristics of new fund
offers.14 I concentrate on funds that were started during Regimes 2 and 3 because the highest
proportion of information for these funds is available on the internet. There were a total of 45
closed-end funds started during Regimes 2 and 3 and I was able to find the initial issue expenses
charged for 29 of these. There were a total of 53 open-end funds started during Regimes 2 and 3,
and I was able to find the entry loads charged for 52 of them.
There is also an important difference in the way funds reported initial issue expenses versus
entry loads. For entry loads, the offer documents and websites clearly state what the entry load
charged will be. For closed-end funds, however, 12 of the funds provide data on the initial issue
expenses. The remaining 17 funds state ”Initial Issue Expenses not exceeding 6% incurred by the
Mutual Fund will be charged to the Scheme and will be amortised over a period of three years.”
Thus, for these 17 funds, it is possible that they eventually charged less than six percent in initial
issue expenses. Of course, if the firm intended to charge less than six percent it would seem in its
interest to state that they would charge a lower initial expense to gain a competitive advantage.
For clarity, I report summary statistics of fee levels charged for both those that estimated their
initial issue expenses, and those that just gave an upper-bound on expenses.
12In 1999 tax rates for corporations on holding mutual funds were lowered below tax rates for directly holding
securities, so corporations began using short term closed-end mutual funds for cash management purposes (Kamiyama,
2007).
13I adjusted the raw data for inflation in India using the All Commodities Wholesale Price inflation rate taken from
www.indiastat.com (Source: Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Govt. of India.) I then converted the 2009 rupees
into 2009 U.S. dollars using the exchange rate of 46.235 rupees/dollar taken from finance.yahoo.in on November 17,
2009.




Before presenting regression based evidence, I present graphs which illustrate the main results.
Figures 1 and 2 plot the number of equity mutual funds started monthly over the period October
1999 through August 2009. The pattern closely matches the predictions of the shrouding hypothesis.
In Regime 1, the part of the x-axis before the first dashed vertical bar, we see that the open-ended
organizational form dominated amongst equity funds. In Regime 2, we see a relatively large number
of closed-end funds being started. Before Regime 2 there were only two closed-end equity fund
started, one in February of 2001 and one in January of 2001. The rightmost dashed vertical bar
indicates the end of Regime 2 and the beginning of Regime 3. The second law change produced a
dramatic drop-off in the number of new closed-end funds started. All of the funds started in 2008
in this figure were able to charge the amortizable initial issue expenses because the opening date
of their new period occurred before January 31, 2008. 15
The hand-collected data on initial issue expenses and entry loads shows that closed-end funds
estimated their initial issue expenses at 6 percent, whereas open-ended funds charged an average of
1.75 percent in entry loads. The remaining closed-end funds did not precisely indicate their initial
issue expenses, instead stating they would charge up to 6 percent in initial issue expenses. Figure
5 plots the fee charged for all of the funds with data and shows that open-ended funds charged
between 0 and 3 percent entry loads during Regimes 2 and 3, with the majority of funds charging
2.25 percent. No closed-end fund estimated it would charge less than 6 percent in initial issue
expenses.
If investors were truly willing to pay extra expenses for access to closed-end equity funds
during Regime 2 then they would have been willing to pay extra to access closed-end funds during
Regime 3. Yet based on the results here it appears that mutual fund investors would not have
paid the higher “issue expenses” of closed-end funds once mutual fund companies were forced to
disclose them as entry-loads. In other words, by re-framing those issue expenses as entry loads it
appears that closed-end equity funds were forced to compete with open-ended equity funds, and in
the investors’ eyes they were not a good enough product to warrant the extra expense.
15In the case of one fund, the ”Sundaram BNP Paribas Select Thematic Funds - Entertainment Opportunities” I
found an initial offer document stating that the fund would be a closed end fund. However, the fund actually debuted
as an open-ended fund on May 24, 2008. Interestingly, it appears that the fund company changed this specific fund
from closed to open-ended when it was no longer possible to charge the amortized issue expenses.
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5.2 Regression Evidence on Mutual Fund Starts and Flows
To identify the effect of the law change 1 and law change 2 I use a difference-in-difference approach.
I test whether the number of closed-end funds started and the amount of flows into closed-end
funds was statistically different during Regime 2 relative to fund starts and flows to open-ended
funds. I use the regression specification:
Sit = β0 + β1Returnt−1 + β2R2it + β3Closedi + β4R2it ∗ Closedi + it
Each observation represents describes a type of fund i ∈ {Closed,Open} in month*year t. Sit
is the number of funds started or the amount of money (in 2009 millions US$) of fund type i in
month*year t. For example in June 2007 two open-ended funds were started. Returnt−1 is return
on the Bombay Sensex index for one month prior to t.16 R2it is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 for months during Regime 2 and 0 for all other months. Closedi is a dummy that
takes the value of one for observations that represents starts or amounts for closed end funds, and
takes the value 0 for observations that represent starts or amounts for open-ended funds. Our main
prediction is that β4 > 0. If investors are not cognizant of the higher initial issue expenses charged
by closed-end funds then we should expect mutual fund companies to start more closed-end funds
during this period and for money to flow into them, and for this increase to be larger than the
increase that occurs for open-ended funds during Regime 2.
Table 3 presents these results. Columns (1) and (2) focus on the number of funds started as
the dependent variable. Column (1) includes all month*years available on the AMFI website for a
total of 120 month*years for closed-end funds and 120 month*years for open-end funds (for a total
sample size of 240). The coefficient on the Regime 2 dummy shows that for open-ended funds there
was no significant difference in the number of funds started during Regime 2. The coefficient on
the Closed dummy shows that overall closed-end funds are less likely to be started than open-ended
funds. The coefficient on the Regime2*Closed variable shows that during Regime 2 closed-end funds
were significantly more likely to be started. In terms of magnitudes, the intercept term implies
that throughout the sample period on average 1.9 new open-ended funds were started per month.
Outside of Regime 2, there was an average of .05 closed-end fund started per month. During
Regime 2, however, there was an average of 2.1 closed-end funds started per month. Thus, the fee
structure imposed during Regime 2 essentially equalized the number of closed-end and open-ended
166 plots the level of the Bombay Sensex index over the study period for reference.
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funds started while outside of Regime 2 new open-ended funds dominated. This data confirms the
earlier illustrative figures to show that the Regime 2 period was not generally a period of greater
increase in new funds, but a focused expansion in closed-end funds.
Column (2) restricts the sample to only include the periods 22 months before Regime 2 began
and 20 months after Regime 2 ended. There are 64 observations of closed-end starts and flows (22
before Regime 2, 22 during Regime 2, and 20 after Regime 217). I report these results because
it is likely that using a shorter window around Regime 2 yields better comparison groups than
including all of the observations in Column (1). The results in Column (2) are consistent with
those in Column (1).
Columns (3) and (4) report the same specifications as Columns (1) and (2) however the
dependent variable is the amount of funds flowing into fund type i in month*year t. These results
confirm that the amounts flowing into closed-end funds during Regime 2 were significantly higher
than the commensurate increase in funds flowing to open-ended funds during Regime 2. In Column
(3) the coefficient on the Regime2*Closed dummy is not statistically significant at the 10 percent
level; however, the p-value is .148 which is close to the 10 percent significant level. When I restrict
the sample to the shorter event window in Column (4) the coefficient on the Regime2*Closed
variable becomes larger and significant at the 5 percent level. The results change strongly because
in Column (3) the comparison group includes months before 2006 when both open-end and closed-
end funds took in substantially smaller amounts per month. Relative to the comparison group
prior to 2005 both open-end and closed-end funds took in more funds during Regime 2. In terms
of magnitudes in specification (4), the results are similar to those for fund starts. Throughout
the sample period there was an average of 1,943 million 2009 $US flowing into open-ended funds
per month versus approximately zero flowing into closed-ended funds. During Regime 2, however,
there was an average of 1,943 million $US flowing into open-ended funds and 2,201 million $US
flowing into closed-end funds per month. The free structure allowed during Regime 2 equalized
the flows into open and closed funds relative to the periods outside of Regime 2 when open-ended
funds dominated. Overall the results on both the number of funds started and amount inflows
confirm that closed-end funds experienced a strong surge during Regime 2 when compared to new
open-ended funds as a control group.
As an alternative specification I test whether the fraction of monies that flows into closed-
ended equity funds responded significantly to the new framing of fund fees in Regime 2 relative to
17I include all periods after Regime 2 that I have data for.
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Regimes 1 and Regime 3. I test this using the following regression specification:
FCjt = β0 + β1R2jt + jt
where j indexes a type of fund ∈ {Equity, ELSS, Balanced} and t indexes a month-year (e.g.
June 2006). FCjt is the fraction of money going into new fund offers of closed-end equity funds
versus open-ended equity funds. I include a dummy variable to signify Regime 2, R2jt, which is
equal to 1 during Regime 2 when closed end funds were allowed to charge the separate ”shrouded”
initial issue expenses. The unit of observation is a month. The analysis includes only months where
there was a positive flow of money to closed or open equity funds over the period October 1999
through September 2009 (120 months total), i.e. 24 months were dropped over this period because
no money flowed into new closed or open funds during these months.
Table 4 presents these regression results. Column (1) shows that the proportion of funds
flowing into closed-ended equity funds is 43 percentage points higher during Regime 2, and that
this difference is significant at the 1 percent level. Column (2) includes a control a for the lagged
1 period return on the Sensex index, which is a value-weighted index of the largest 30 firms (by
market-capitalization) on the Bombay Stock Exchange. Columns (3) and (4) replicate these results
including additional fund classes that are overall much smaller than the income and equity classes.
I include balanced funds which primarily hold equities and ELSSequity funds that are primarily
tax-savings vehicles and also primarily hold equities. I categorize all of these as ”equity” funds
because they have similar levels of retail participation as the main equity funds. The results in
Columns (3) and (4) are very similar to those in Columns (1) and (2).
6 Alternative Explanations: Theoretical Determinants of Closed
vs. Open Ended Fund Proportions
6.1 Price Ceilings
An alternative explanation is that the transition from Regime 1 to Regime 2 instituted a price
ceiling on open-ended funds (therefore leading to more closed-ended funds), while the transition
from Regime 2 to Regime 3 instituted a price-cap on closed-ended funds (leading to the demise of
closed-ended funds).
I first discuss why the transition from Regime 1 to Regime 2 did not impose a lower price-cap
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on open-ended funds versus closed-ended funds. Regime 2 allowed open-ended funds to charge
up to a six percent entry load and allowed closed-end funds to charge up to six percent in initial
issue expenses. The only meaningful difference between these two types of fees is that initial issue
expenses could be amortized over three years, whereas entry loads were required to be collected
up-front. Given that amortizing fees makes it possible to collect lower fees (in terms of present
value), there is no reason to believe that open-ended funds were prohibited from charging higher
fees than closed-ended funds. Thus the transition from Regime 1 to Regime 2 did not involve the
imposition of lower price ceilings for open-ended funds. In the transition from Regime 2 to Regime
3, closed-ended funds were forced to charge entry loads instead of initial issue expenses. Again,
this change did not impose a price-cap on closed-ended funds because being allowed to charge six
percent in entry loads (Regime 3) was at least as generous as charging six percent in initial issue
expenses in Regime 2.
There is also no evidence to suggest that the price ceiling on operating expenses that closed
versus open ended funds could charge changed around the same time that law changes studied here
changed.
6.2 Demand for Amortization vs. Entry Loads
Another possible explanation for the growth in closed-ended funds over this period is that investors
may have a strong preference to amortize their entry fees over a period of time. The only differ-
ence between between initial issue expenses where amortization is allowed and entry loads where
amortization is not allowed is that, under amortization, the present value of fees is lower because
fees are paid in the future. If investors’ discount rates were high enough, then forcing open-ended
funds to charge entry loads instead of initial issue expenses could have made closed-end funds very
attractive during Regime 2.
One way to determine whether this story is plausible is to calculate how high the discount
rates of the people who purchased closed-end funds would have to have been to justify paying 6
percent fees over time versus 2.25 percent fees up front. Typically closed-end funds during Regime 2
were either three or five year terms. For a three year closed-end fund, I calculate that an individual
would have to have a discount rate of 790 percent per year to prefer a closed-end fund with initial
issue expenses of six percent amortized over three years, versus an open-ended fund with an entry
load of 2.25 percent. For a five year closed-end fund, Column 2 shows that an individual would
have to have a discount rate of 564 percent per year to prefer a closed-end fund that had initial
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issue expenses of six percent versus an open-ended fund that had an entry load of 2.25 percent.
The main reason discount rates would have to be so large is that the term of the closed-end funds
offered was not long enough for any reasonable discount rate to make a difference in the present
value of fees. Accordingly it seems extremely unlikely that rational discounting can explain why
disallowing closed-end funds to charge initial issue expenses and forcing them to charge entry loads
led to the demise of the equity closed-end fund market.
6.3 Other Theoretical Determinants of Closed vs. Open Ended Funds
To organize my discussion of other possible explanations for the rise of importance of closed-end
funds during Regime 2 I focus on the model presented in Stein (2005). Stein presents a theoretical
model to explain the equilibrium distribution of closed-end versus open-ended funds. To begin, he
notes that the key difference between closed and open ended funds is that open-ended funds must
worry about client redemptions at all points in time. This makes it fundamentally more difficult for
open-ended funds to pursue long-run arbitrage strategies. If an arbitrage position moves against
an open-ended fund, in the short run, the fund will be forced to unwind the position if clients make
short-run redemptions. A closed-end fund, however, has less obligations to make redemptions
and so can maintain the long-run arbitrage position until it pays off. Stein (2005) focuses on the
standard variant of closed-end funds where investors can only redeem their money by selling on a
secondary market. In the Indian context, closed-end funds have limited liquidity because investors
cannot redeem their money except for at specified redemption periods. Given this fundamental
weakness of open-ended funds, Stein (2005) points out that the prevalence of open-ended funds in
the United States is a puzzle.
A possible explanation for the rise in closed-end funds over the period I study could be
an improvement in the ability of investors to monitor what their fund managers are doing. If
monitoring improved during this period then investors would have an additional incentive to invest
in closed-end funds to take advantage of longer run arbitrage strategies. There are two reasons
why this is unlikely to explain the emergence of closed-end funds during Regime 2. Based on the
record of regulations issued by SEBI there were no policy changes during this period that were
instituted and then un-instituted during Regime 2. It also seems unlikely that investors somehow
gained better monitoring technology on their own during Regime 2 and then somehow lost this
monitoring technology during Regime 3. Second, the Indian closed-end funds offered substantial
liquidity because they had pre-specified periods when investors could redeem at NAV. For the 22
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(out of 45) closed-end funds where data was available 5 offered daily redemption, 2 offered weekly
redemption, 9 offered monthly redemption, 2 offered quarterly redemption, and 3 offered half-yearly
redemption. Given that the majority of closed-end funds during Regime 2 had frequent redemption,
it seems unlikely demands for limited liquidity explain the importance of closed-end funds during
Regime 2.
6.4 Did Closed-End Fund Investors Get Higher Returns?
Another possible alternative explanation for the emergence of closed-end funds during Regime 2 is
that the closed-end funds on the market during this period offered higher returns, and thus investors
found it worthwhile to pay higher fees for these funds. In this section I calculate the returns earned
by both closed and open ended funds offered during this period before entry and initial expense
fees (but including operating expenses which are the same for all funds I study).
From the Association of Mutual Funds of India (AMFI) website I created a comprehensive
list of all closed and open-ended equity mutual funds started after April 4, 2006. The AMFI website
has online monthly reports that list new mutual fund schemes launched in each month. For each
of these funds I collected information from the “Investors Zone” link on the AMFI website. This
link allows the user to view all of the NAV data for each fund. There were a total of 125 funds
started over this period. For 24 of these, no NAVs were provided on the AMFI website. 18 For an
additional 4 funds, the NAV data was truncated, i.e. the NAV data was not consistently reported
on the AMFI website. I include the returns on these four funds along with the 97 funds for which
I have complete NAV data in my return calculations.
The net-asset values reported for open-end funds do not include the entry load paid by the
investor. The amortization of fees for closed-end funds is built into the net asset values, so to
obtain pre-fee returns I need to add back in the fees the investor is paying through the declining
net asset value in a closed-end fund. Suppose a closed-end fund charged six percent in initial issue
expenses and an investor purchased one unit at 10 rupees during the new fund offer period. This
investor would then owe the fund .06 rupees as initial issue expenses. This .06 rupees would be
taken out of the assets of the fund in equal pieces over all of the trading days over the first three
years of the fund. In the case where the investor withdrew the money before the end of the first
three years, the balance of initial issue expenses owed to the fund company would be withdrawn.
18The fraction of closed-end funds not reporting data is equal to 24 percent. The fraction of open-ended funds not
reporting data was equal to approximately 17 percent. Thus, the non-reporting of NAV on the AMFI website does
not appear to be strongly related closed or open-ended status.
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I assume that there were 750 trading days over the first three years of the closed-end fund. Thus,
for each trading day .06/750 = .0008 rupees per day is added to the reported daily NAV of the
closed-end funds. This adjusts the data so the returns I calculate do not include the effects of the
initial issue expenses.
To control for aggregate market movements, we subtract the returns of the Bombay Sensex
index from the raw calculated net returns over the period the particular fund existed. We find that,
after adjusting for these aggregate returns, closed-end funds had an average monthly return of -
.0039 compared to the average monthly return on open-end funds of .0000 (before fees). Controlling
for market risk factors as in Fama and French (1993), we find closed-end funds did not outperform
open-end funds in Regime 2 and afterwards. The calculated alpha from the CAPM and 3-factor
model suggest closed-end funds provided respectively 76 and 89 basis points per month less than
open-ended funds and these performance differences are statiscally significant at the 95% confidence
level.
Based on these calculations, it does not appear that closed-end funds offered higher returns
commensurate with the greater fees they charged; in fact, we find that open-ended funds performed
slightly better over this period. In addition, closed-end funds also offered less liquidity in that money
could only be withdrawn at set intervals. This evidence suggests that closed-end fund investors did
not receive higher returns commensurate with the substantially larger fees.
7 Conclusion
We present new evidence on the importance of shrouded fund fees using a natural experiment in the
Indian mutual fund industry. When closed-end funds could charge amortized fees, which are plausi-
bly more shrouded than entry loads, many closed-end funds were established in a short time-frame.
Forcing closed-end funds to charge entry loads effectively curtailed their growth. We calculate that
Indian investors spent approximately 500 million dollars in fees due to this shrouding. In light
of the recent experimental literature that finds many framing manipulations to be unsuccessful in
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Table 1: Three Regimes of Mutual Fund Pricing
This table shows the maximum allowable fees that could be charged by open and closed-ended funds across the three Regimes
studied. The period before April 4, 2006 is Regime 1, the period from April 4, 2006 through January 31, 2008 is Regime 2,
and the period after January 31, 2008 is Regime 3. Initial Issue expenses is a fee calculated as a percent of the initial
investment withdrawn in small increments over the first three years of the fund’s existence. These limits are derived from
Securities and Exchange Board of India (2009).
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Type of Fund: Open Closed Open Closed Open Closed
Initial Issue Expenses (%) 6 6 0 6 0 0
Entry Loads (%) 6 6 6 0 6 6

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Effect of Closed-End Fund Shrouding of Fees on Fund Starts and Inflows
This table presents regressions where the unit of observation is a month x type of fund combination. The dependent variable
is either the number of new funds started of the amount of inflows into new funds. The Regime 2 dummy takes a value of 1
during the period April 2006 - January 2008 when closed end funds were allowed to charge initial issue expenses in place of
entry loads. I argue that because initial issue expenses were allowed to amortized that they constituted a “shrouded” fee. The
variable lagged relevant return is the one month lagged monthly return of the Sensex index, which is a value-weighted index of
the 30 largest firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. Columns (1) and (2) focus on the number of funds started as the
dependent variable. Columns (3) and (4) focus on the amount of inflows (2009 millions of USD$) started as the dependent
variable. Columns (1) and (3) include all month*years available on the AMFI website for a total of 120 month*years for
closed-end funds and 120 month*years for open-end funds (for a total sample size of 240). Columns (2) and (4) restrict the
sample to the 22 months before Regime 2 and the 20 months after Regime 2 to provide a more similar comparison group to
Regime 2. Robust standard errors in brackets.
Dep Var = Starts Dep Var = Amounts (Millions 2009 $U.S.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sensex 1 Month Lagged Return -1.30 -0.85 40.8 -73.0
[1.06] [1.35] [252.6] [414.4]
Regime 2 Dummy -0.05 -0.97 149.1 -71.9
[0.47] [0.54] [104.8] [144.7]
Closed Dummy -1.86*** -2.76*** -193.4*** -409.2***
[0.19] [0.32] [52.0] [112.4]
Regime2*Closed Dummy 2.08*** 2.99*** 260.2 475.9**
[0.72] [0.77] [179.4] [206.6]
Constant 1.89*** 2.80*** 197.3*** 420.2***
[0.19] [0.32] [51.5] [111.9]
Adjusted R-squared 0.25 0.27 0.1 0.081
Number of Observations 240 128 240 128
Mean of Dependent Variable 1.13 1.59 152.2 271.3
* Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 4: Effect of Closed-End Fund Shrouding of Fees on Fraction of Flows to Closed-End Funds
This table presents regressions where the unit of observation is a month x type of fund combination. The dependent variable
is the proportion of total flows to new equity mutual funds that went to new closed-ended equity funds. Months where no
funds flowed to new open or closed equity funds are dropped (24 months dropped in Columns 1 and 2). The Regime 2 dummy
takes a value of 1 during the period April 2006 - January 2008 when closed end funds were allowed to charge initial issue
expenses in place of entry loads. I argue that because initial issue expenses were allowed to amortized that they constituted a
“shrouded” fee. The variable lagged relevant return is the one month lagged monthly return of the Sensex index, which is a
value-weighted index of the 30 largest firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. Robust standard errors in brackets.
Equity Funds Only Equity, ELSS, and Balanced Funds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regime 2 Dummy 0.43** 0.44** 0.46** 0.46**
[0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
Lagged Relevant Return -0.68 -0.18
[0.40] [0.38]
Constant 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.08
[0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
Observations 96 96 140 139
Adjusted R-squared 0.33 0.35 0.28 0.28
Mean Dep Var: 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.19
* Significant at the 5% level. ** Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 5: Performance Comparison of Closed-End and Open-End Funds
This tables shows that closed-end fund did not outperform open-end fund in regime 2 and afterwards. We calculate raw and
market excess returns for both closed-end and open-end fund. In order to compare market risk-adjusted returns, we construct
a multi-factor model as of Fama and French(1993). 6 month yield of India Treasury bill was used for risk-free rate and BSE
Sensex Index was used as a proxy for wealth return. India market mimicking portfolios are formed in January of year t,
2004∼2010. Size factor SMB (small minus big) was constructed using market capitalization of January, year t.
Book-to-market factor HML (high minus low) was constructed using book-value of fiscal year ending in April, year t− 1 .
Market value of t− 1 was used to calculate the ratio of book value and market value. At every January, we divide India BSE
listed companies into 2 size categories and 3 book-to-market ratio categories. Value-weighted returns of each categories are
used to calculate size factor SMB = 1
3
((S/H + S/M + S/L)− (B/H +B/M +B/L)) and book-to-market factor
HML = 1
2
((H/B +H/S)− (L/B + L/S)). 1−factor model is
portfolio excess return = α+ β ×market excess return
and 3-factor model is
portfolio excess return = α+ β1 ×market excess return + β2 × SMB + β3 ×HML
.
Closed-End Funds Open-End Funds Difference p-value
Monthly Raw Returns 0.0053 0.0117 -0.0064 0.0800
Monthly BSE Adjusted Return -0.0039 0.0000 -0.0039 0.2369
1-Factor Alpha -0.0048 0.0028 -0.0076 0.0100
3-Factor Alpha -0.0077 0.0012 -0.0089 0.0030
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Figure 1: New Equity Open-Ended Fund Starts
This figure plots the number of new equity open-ended mutual funds started, per month, in the Indian mutual fund market
from October 1999 through September 2009. The left most dashed vertical line indicates the end of Regime 1 and the
beginning of Regime 2 (May 2006). The right most dashed vertical line indicates the end of Regime 2 and the beginning of
Regime 3 (February, 2008).
Figure 2: New Equity Closed-Ended Fund Starts
This figure plots the number of new equity closed-end mutual funds started, per month, in the Indian mutual fund market
from October 1999 through September 2009. The left most dashed vertical line indicates the end of Regime 1 and the
beginning of Regime 2 (May 2006). The right most dashed vertical line indicates the end of Regime 2 and the beginning of
Regime 3 (February 2008).
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Figure 3: New Equity Open-Ended Fund Amount Inflows
This figure plots the amount of inflows to equity open-ended mutual funds, per month, in the Indian mutual fund market from
October 1999 through September 2009. The amounts are reported in 2009 millions of U.S. dollars. The left most dashed
vertical line indicates the end of Regime 1 and the beginning of Regime 2 (May 2006). The right most vertical line indicates
the end of Regime 2 and the beginning of Regime 3 (February, 2008).
Figure 4: New Equity Closed-Ended Fund Amount Inflows
This figure plots the amount of inflows to equity open-ended mutual funds, per month, in the Indian mutual fund market from
October 1999 through September 2009. The amounts are reported in 2009 millions of U.S. dollars. The left most dashed
vertical line indicates the end of Regime 1 and the beginning of Regime 2 (May 2006). The right most vertical line indicates













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: The Bombay Stock Exchange Sensex Index
This figure plots the level of the Bombay Stock Exchange Sensex index adjusted for inflation. The Sensex is a value weighted
index of the 30 largest companies traded on the Bombay Stock Exchange. Author’s calculations based on index values taken
from finance.yahoo.in and price indices taken from www.indiastat.in. The left most dashed vertical line indicates the end of
Regime 1 and the beginning of Regime 2 (May 2006). The right most dashed vertical line indicates the end of Regime 2 and
the beginning of Regime 3 (February, 2008).
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8 Appendix
In this appendix, we explain briefly the procedure of constructing the Indian stock market mimicking
portfolio as in Fama and French (1992) and Fama and French (1993).
We use nonfinancial firms listed on the Indian Bombay Stock Exchange(BSE) from FactSet
Research Systems Inc. 19 Data for stock price, book-value and shares outstanding were retrieved for
April 2006 through February 2010. We exclude financial firms from the analysis because leverage
for nonfinancial firms may imply a different corporate situation from that of financial firms. For
constructing the size factor (SMB) and book-to-market ratio factor (HML) in India stock mar-
ket, we follow closely Fama and French (1992, 1993)’s procedure for market-mimicking portfolio
construction.
Market-equity (ME) is used to measure a firm’s size, which is calculated as stock price
multiplied by shares outstanding. For assessing a firm’s size, we use market-equity at the end of
January at year t. In order to ensure accounting information is reflected in stock price, we match
accounting data for fiscal year that ends in calendar year t − 1 with stock price data for calendar
year t. To compute book-to-market ratio, we use firm’s market-equity at the end of January at
year t− 1.
At every January, we sort firms into two size categories (Big and Small) and 3 book-to-market
categories (High, Median, Low) according to its market equity and book-to-market ratio. Median
and 30% /70% percentile are used as break points for size sorting and book-to-market ratio sorting.
After assigning one of six categories (B/L, B/M, B/H, S/L, S/M, S/H) to every firm, we calculate
monthly return for each firm in each category. Then we calculate value-weighted return of firms’
return at each category. Size factor SMB is calculated as a weighted sum of small companies’ return




[(S/L+ S/M + S/H)− (B/L+B/M +B/H)]
Book-to-market ratio HML is calculated as a weighted sum of high book-to-market companies’




[(H/S +H/B)− (L/S + L/B)]
19FactSet covers 97% of the total Indian market capitalization as of June 2009.
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Note that the frequency of return data is monthly but a company’s category may change annually
each January.
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